This paper examines the e¤ects that passive investments in rival …rms have on the incentives of …rms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry.
Introduction
There are many cases in which …rms acquire their rivals' stock as passive investments that give them a share in the rivals' pro…ts but not in the rivals' decision making. For example, Microsoft acquired in August 1997 approximately 7% of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the PC market, and in June 1999 it took a 10% stake in Inprise/Borland Corp. which is one of its main competitors in the software applications market.
1 Gillette, the international and U.S. leader in the wet shaving razor blade market acquired 22.9% of the nonvoting stock and approximately 13:6% of the debt of Wilkinson Sword, one of its largest rivals. 2 Investments in rivals are often multilateral; examples of industries that feature complex webs of partial cross ownerships include the Japanese and the U.S. automobile industries (Alley, 1997) , the global airline industry (Airline Business, 1998), the Dutch Financial Sector (Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink, 2000) , the Nordic power market (Amundsen and Bergman, 2002) , and the global steel industry (Gilo and Spiegel, 2003) . There are also many cases in which a controller (majority or dominant shareholder) makes a passive investment in rivals. For instance, during the …rst half of the 90's, National Car Rental's controller, GM, passively held a 25% stake in Avis, National's rival in the car rental industry, while Hertz's controller, Ford, had acquired 100% of the preferred nonvoting stock of Budget Rent a Car (Purohit and Staelin, 1994 and Talley, 1990 ).
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While horizontal mergers are subject to substantial antitrust scrutiny and are often opposed by antitrust authorities, passive investments in rivals were either granted a de facto exemption from antitrust liability or have gone unchallenged by antitrust agencies in recent cases (Gilo, 2000) . 4 This lenient approach towards passive investments in rivals stems from the 1 See "Microsoft Investments Draw Federal Scrutiny," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 10, 1997, B-11, and "Corel Again Buys a "Victim" of Microsoft Juggernaut," The Ottawa Citizen, February 8, 2000, C1.
2 United States v. Gillette Co., 55 FR 28312 (1990) . 3 See also "Will Ford Become The New Repo Man?; Financial Powerhouse Takes Aim at Bad Credit Risks," N.Y Times, December 15, 1996, Section 3, p. 1. For additional examples of investments by …rms and their controllers in rivals, see Gilo (2000) . 4 To the best of our knowledge, Microsoft's investments in the nonvoting stocks of Apple and Inprise/Borland Corp. were not challenged by antitrust agencies while Gillette's 22:9% stake in Wilkinson Sword was approved by the DOJ after the DOJ was assured that this stake would be passive (see United States v. Gillette Co. 55 Fed. Reg. at 28,312). The FTC approved TCI's 9% stake in Time Warner (TCI's main rival in the cable TV industry at the time) and even allowed TCI to raise its stake in Time Warner to 14:99% in the future, after being assured that TCI's stake would be completely passive (see Re Time Warner Inc., 61 FR 50301, 1996) . The FTC also agreed to a consent decree approving Medtronic Inc.'s almost 10% passive stake in SurVivaLink, one of the only two rivals of Medtronic's subsidiary in the automated External De…briallators market (see Re Medtronic, courts' interpretation of the exemption for stock acquisitions "solely for investment" included in Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In this paper we wish to examine whether this lenient approach of courts and antitrust agencies towards passive investments in rivals is justi…ed. Like other horizontal practices (e.g., horizontal mergers), (passive) partial cross ownership (PCO) arrangements raise two main antitrust concerns: concerns about unilateral competitive e¤ects and concerns about coordinated competitive e¤ects. We focus on the latter and study the e¤ect of PCO on the ability of …rms to engage in tacit collusion. To this end, we consider an in…nitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly model in which …rms and/or their controllers acquire some of their rivals ' (nonvoting) shares.
This setting allows us to deal with the complexity generated by the chain-e¤ects of multilateral PCO. This complexity arises since in general, the pro…t of each …rm, both under collusion as well as under deviation from collusion, depends on the whole set of PCO in the industry and not only on the …rm's own stake in rivals. Another advantage of this model is that PCO does not a¤ect the equilibrium in the one shot case. Consequently, the competitive e¤ect of PCO comes only from its e¤ect on the incentive of …rms to engage in tacit collusion. We say that PCO arrangements facilitate tacit collusion if they expand the range of discount factors for which tacit collusion can be sustained.
It might be thought that since PCO allows …rms to internalize part of the harm they impose on rivals when deviating from a collusive scheme, any increase in the level of PCO in the industry will necessarily facilitate tacit collusion. This intuition, however, ignores the fact that PCO arrangements create an in…nite recursion between the pro…ts of …rms who hold each other's shares, both under collusion as well as following a deviation from collusion. Consequently, PCO arrangements a¤ect the incentive of each …rm to collude in a complex and subtle way.
Despite this complexity, we are able to prove that an increase in the stake of …rm r in a rival …rm s never hinders collusion. Moreover, we show that such an increase will surely facilitate collusion provided that (i) each …rm in the industry holds a stake in at least one rival,
(ii) the maverick …rm in the industry (the …rm with the strongest incentive to deviate from Inc., FTC File No. 981-0324, 1998 ). a collusive agreement) 5 has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm r; 6 and (iii) …rm s is not the industry maverick. If either one of these conditions fail, the increased stake of …rm r in …rm s will not a¤ect tacit collusion. In addition, we show that a controlling shareholder (whether a person or a parent corporation) can facilitate tacit collusion further by making a direct passive investment in rival …rms. Such investment particularly facilitates collusion if the controller has a relatively small stake in his own …rm.
The unilateral competitive e¤ects of PCO have been already studied in the context of static oligopoly models by Reynolds and Snapp (1986) , Bolle and Güth (1992) , Flath (1991 Flath ( , 1992 , Reitman (1994) , and Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink (2000) . 7 Our paper by contrast, focuses on the coordinated competitive e¤ects of PCO and examines a repeated Bertrand model.
The distinction between the unilateral and coordinated competitive e¤ects of PCO is important.
In particular, PCO arrangements that may be unpro…table in static oligopoly models are shown to be pro…table in our model once their coordinated e¤ects are taken into account. For example,
given that in a perfectly competitive capital market the price of the rival's shares re ‡ects their post-acquisition value, an investing …rm can gain only if its own shares increase in value. As Flath (1991) shows, this is the case only when product market competition involves strategic complements. 8 By contrast, our results show that once repeated interaction is taken into account, …rms may bene…t from investing in rivals even if such investments have no e¤ect in one shot interactions. Reitman (1994) shows that symmetric …rms may not wish to invest in rivals because such investments bene…t noninvesting …rms more than they bene…t the investing …rms. In our 5 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and FTC de…ne maverick …rms as "…rms that have a greater economic incentive to deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of their rivals," see www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html. In practice, antitrust agencies identify industry mavericks according to various characteristics, including their past behavior in the industry (see e.g., Federal Trade Commission, v. Arch Coal Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 146 (2004) ). For an excellent discussion of the role that the concept of maverick …rms plays in the analysis of coordinated competitive e¤ects, see Baker (2002) . 6 Firm i has an indirect stake in …rm r if it either has a stake in a …rm that has a stake in …rm r; or if it has a stake in a …rm that has a stake in a …rm that has a stake in …rm r; and so on.
7 See also Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and Kwoka (1992) for a related analysis of static models of horizontal joint ventures. Alley (1997) and Parker and Röller (1997) provide empirical evidence on the e¤ect of PCO on collusion. Alley (1997) …nds that failure to account for PCO leads to misleading estimates of the price-cost margins in the Japanese and U.S. automobile industries. Parker and Röller (1997) …nd that cellular telephone companies in the U.S. tend to collude more in one market if they have a joint venture in another market. 8 Charléty, Fagart, and Souam (2002) study a related model but consider PCO by controllers rather than by …rms. They show that although a controller's investments in rivals lower the pro…t of the controller's …rm, they may increase the rival's pro…t by a larger amount and thereby bene…t the controller at the expense of the minority shareholders in his own …rm. model, there is no such free-rider problem since when …rms are symmetric, all of them need to invest in rivals to sustain tacit collusion (i.e., each …rm is "pivotal").
We are aware of only one other paper, Malueg (1992) , that studies the coordinated e¤ects of PCO. His paper di¤ers from ours in at least three important ways. First, Malueg considers a repeated Cournot game and …nds that in general, PCO has an ambiguous e¤ect on collusion.
The ambiguity arises because in the Cournot model, PCO has two con ‡icting e¤ects. On the one hand, PCO imply that …rms internalize part of the losses that they in ‡ict on rivals when they deviate. On the other hand, PCO also soften product market competition following a breakdown of the collusive scheme and hence strengthen the incentives of …rms to deviate. We believe that in practice, the …rst e¤ect is likely to dominate the second e¤ect, otherwise …rms would have no incentive to invest in rivals. The Bertrand framework that we use allows us to neutralize the negative e¤ect of PCO on collusion and focus attention on the …rst positive e¤ect.
Second, Malueg considers a symmetric duopoly in which the …rms hold identical stakes in one another, while we consider an n …rm oligopoly in which …rms need not have similar stakes in one another. Third, Malueg e¤ectively considers passive investments in rivals by controllers rather than by …rms; consequently, his analysis does not feature the complex chain-e¤ect interaction between the pro…ts of rival …rms which is a main focus of our paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the e¤ect of PCO on the ability of …rms to achieve the fully collusive outcome in the context of an in…nitely repeated Bertrand model with symmetric …rms. Section 3 shows that PCO by …rms' controllers may further facilitate collusion. We conclude in Section 4. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Partial cross ownership (PCO) by …rms
In this section we examine the coordinated competitive e¤ects of PCO in the context of the familiar in…nitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly model with n¸2 identical …rms that produce a homogenous product at a constant marginal cost c: In every period, the n …rms simultaneously choose prices and the lowest price …rm captures the entire market. In case of a tie, the set of lowest price …rms get equal shares of the total sales. Using Q(p) to denote the demand function, the monopoly price is de…ned by
and the monopoly pro…t is
As is well-known (e.g., Tirole, 1988, Ch. 6.3.2 .1), the fully collusive outcome in which all …rms charge p m and each …rm gets an equal share in the monopoly pro…t, ¼ m , can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated game provided that the intertemporal discount factor, ±, is su¢ciently high:
Taking condition (1) as a benchmark, we shall examine the competitive e¤ects of PCO by looking at its e¤ect on the critical discount factor, b ±, above which the fully collusive outcome can be sustained. In other words, b ± will be our measure of the ease of collusion. 9 We will say that PCO arrangements facilitate tacit collusion if they lower b ± and thereby widen the set of discount factors for which the fully collusive scheme can be sustained. Conversely, we will say that PCO hinder tacit collusion if they raise b ±.
Accounting pro…ts under PCO
Let ® ij be …rm i's ownership stake in …rm j. We assume that the pricing decisions of each …rm are e¤ectively made by its controller (i.e., a controlling shareholder). Now, suppose that all controllers adopt the same trigger strategy whereby each …rm charges the monopoly price, p m , in every period unless at least one …rm has charged a di¤erent price in any previous period; from that point onward, all …rms use marginal cost pricing and make 0 pro…ts in every period. 10 To 9 Of course, the repeated game admits multiple equilibria. We focus on the fully collusive outcome and on b ± because this is a standard way to measure the notion of "ease of collusion."
10 Since each …rm can guarantee itself a payo¤ of at least 0 in each period (say by setting a high enough price to ensure that it makes no sales), the Nash reversion is the most severe punishment that …rms can impose on write the condition that ensures that this trigger strategy can support the fully collusive scheme as a subgame perfect equilibrium, we …rst need to express the pro…t of each …rm under collusion and following a deviation from the fully collusive scheme.
If all …rms charge the monopoly price, then each …rm earns ¼ m n directly. In addition, each …rm gets a share in its rivals' pro…ts due to its ownership stake in these …rms. 11 The pro…t of …rm i is therefore
The vector of collusive pro…ts in the industry, ¼ = (¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ; :::; ¼ n ) 0 , is therefore given by the solution of the following equation:
where
0 is an n £ 1 vector and
is an n £ n PCO matrix whose i-th row speci…es …rm i's ownership stakes in its n ¡ 1 rivals (the diagonal terms in A are all 0 because …rms do not hold direct stakes in themselves).
However, if …rm i deviates from the fully collusive scheme and slightly undercuts the monopoly price, then the direct pro…t of all …rms but i (excluding their share in the rivals' pro…ts) is 0; while …rm i's direct pro…t is arbitrarily close to ¼ m ; to simplify matters, we simply write it as ¼ m . After taking into account the shares that …rms have in their rivals' pro…ts, the pro…t of the deviant …rm i is
Consequently, the vector of …rms' pro…ts in the period in which …rm i's each other. 11 We study here "pure" price …xing: …rms …x a price and let consumers randomize their purchases between the n …rms. There could be more elaborate collusive schemes in which …rms also divide the market (not necessarily in equal shares) among themselves. Such schemes however will require some …rms to ration their sales and will therefore be harder for the …rms to enforce and easier for antitrust authorities to detect.
is given by the solution of the following equation: entries. In all subsequent periods following a deviation from the fully collusive scheme, all …rms use marginal cost pricing and make 0 pro…ts.
Equations (2) and (3) reveal that in general, the pro…t of each …rm depends on the pro…ts of all other …rms and on the structure of PCO in the industry. For instance, …rm 1 may get a share ® 12 of …rm 2's pro…t, which may re ‡ect …rm 2's share, ® 25 , in the pro…t of …rm 5; which in turn may re ‡ect …rm 5's share, ® 51 , in the pro…t of …rm 1. Notice that in this example, …rm 1 has a direct stake in …rm 2, but only an indirect stake in …rm 5 due to its stake in …rm 2.
Likewise, …rm 2 has a direct stake in …rm 5 but only an indirect stake in …rm 1, while …rm 5 has a direct stake in …rm 1 but only an indirect stake in …rm 2. The fact that each …rm's pro…t depends on the whole PCO matrix is striking. It implies for instance that a …rm's pro…t and incentive to collude may be a¤ected by a change in PCO levels among rivals even if this change does not a¤ect the …rm directly (i.e., even if the …rm's PCO levels in rivals or the rivals' PCO in that …rm remain unchanged).
To solve (2) and (3), note that the PCO matrix, A, is nonnegative and the sum of each of its columns is strictly less than 1 (the sum of column i represents the aggregate stake of rival …rms in …rm i). Consequently, (2) and (3) are Leontief systems and have unique solutions Berck and Sydsaeter, p. 111) de…ned by
where B´(I ¡ A) ¡1 is the inverse Leontief matrix. We will use b ij to denote the entry in the i-th row and the j-th column in B. The matrix B speci…es the e¤ective stake that "real" equityholders (i.e., controllers and outside equityholders, but not rival …rms) have in the pro…ts of the n …rms. For instance, b ij is the e¤ective stake in …rm j's pro…ts that a "real" equityholder with a 1% direct stake in …rm i receives.
Equation (4) implies that the accounting collusive pro…t of …rm i is
This expression represents the average e¤ective stake that …rm i's "real" equityholders have in the n …rms times the industry pro…t, ¼ m . However, if …rm i deviates from the fully collusive scheme, then its one time pro…t is ¼
where b ii is the e¤ective stake that …rm i's "real" equityholders have in …rm i's pro…t. And, if …rm j deviates from the fully collusive scheme, then …rm i's one time pro…t is ¼
Given the key role that the matrix B plays in what follows, we now study its properties in Lemma 1. The proof of the lemma appears in the Appendix along with all other proofs.
Lemma 1: The inverse Leontief matrix B has the following properties:
for all i; and 0 · b ij < b ii for all i and all j 6 = i.
(ii) Let i and j be two distinct …rms. Then, b ij = 0 if and only if …rm i does not have a direct
or an indirect stake in …rm j.
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(iii) b ii > 1 if and only if there exists a …rm j 6 = i such that …rm j has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm i (i.e., b ji > 0) and …rm i has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm j (i.e.,
Part (i) of Lemma 1 shows that a 1% stake in each …rm i may give the "real" equityholders of …rm i more than a 1% share in the …rm's pro…t. Intuitively, a "real" equityholder of …rm i is entitled to a fraction of …rm i's pro…t in direct proportion to his equity stake in the …rm.
Indeed, absent PCO, B = I, so b ii = 1 : the equityholder's share in …rm i's pro…t is equal to his equity stake in the …rm. Things are di¤erent however when …rm i has a stake in rival …rms, which in turn have direct or indirect stakes in …rm i. In that case, part of …rm i's pro…t ‡ows back to the …rm. As part (iii) of the lemma shows, the "real" equityholder of …rm i captures in this case an additional fraction of …rm i's pro…t, so his total share in …rm i's pro…t exceeds his equity stake in the …rm, i.e., b ii > 1. Part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that a "real" equityholders of …rm i will receive a share in …rm j's pro…t, unless …rm i has no direct or indirect stake in . Nonetheless, since part (i) of Lemma 1 shows that b ii > b ij for all i and all j 6 = i, the pro…t of each …rm i when it deviates from the fully collusive scheme, ¼
It is important to note that since
, so the aggregate accounting pro…ts under collusion, and following a deviation by some …rm j, will overstate the …rms' cash ‡ows.
13 Part (iv) of the lemma ensures however that the aggregate payo¤s of "real" equityholders are not overstated and do sum up to ¼ m . To see why, notice that 1¡ P k6 =j ® kj is the aggregate stake of "real" equityholders in each …rm j, and ³ 1 ¡ P k6 =j ® kj´bji is their aggregate share in the pro…ts of …rm i. Part (iv) of Lemma 1 shows that the aggregate shares of "real" equityholders (of all …rms) in each …rm i's pro…t, b b i , sum up to 1. This ensures in turn that the aggregate payo¤s of the "real" equityholders sum up to the industry pro…t, ¼ m . Indeed, if we premultiply both sides of (2) by the summation 1 £ n vector (1; :::; 1) and rearrange terms, we get
where the left hand side of the equality is the aggregate payo¤s of "real" equityholders. A similar computation shows that this is also the case following a deviation by some …rm j from the fully collusive scheme. 
Collusion with PCO
Given the pro…ts of the n …rms under collusion and following a deviation from the fully collusive scheme, the condition that ensures that the fully collusive outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium is°i
where°i i is the ownership stake of …rm i's controller. When (6) holds, the in…nite discounted payo¤ of each controller under collusion exceeds his one time gain when his …rm deviates from the collusive scheme. Consequently, no controller wishes to unilaterally deviate from the fully collusive scheme.
Recalling that (6) immediately yields the following result:
Lemma 2: With PCO, the fully collusive outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated game if and only if
The intuition for Lemma 2 is as follows. Although the n …rms produce a homogenous product and have the same marginal cost, their incentives to collude are not necessarily identical the collusive pro…ts are ¼ 1 = 100 2 + 0:25¼ 2 and ¼ 2 = 100 2 + 0:25¼ 1 . Solving this system, we get ¼ 1 = ¼ 2 = 66:66, implying that the collusive payo¤ of each controller is 66:66 £ 0:75 = 50. Consequently, the controllers' payo¤s sum up to 100 (the real cash ‡ow) despite the fact that the accounting pro…ts sum up to 133:33. If …rm 1's controller, say, deviates, the pro…ts become ¼ 1 = 100 + 0:25¼ 2 and ¼ 2 = 0 + 0:25¼ 1 , so ¼ 1 = 106:66 and ¼ 2 = 26:66. Now, the controllers' payo¤s are 80 and 20, respectively. Again, these payo¤s sum up to 100 despite the fact that the …rms' pro…ts sum up to 133:33. It is worth noting that due to the fact that …rm 1 receives part of its cash ‡ow back from …rm 2, controller 1 captures 80% of the industry pro…ts despite the fact that he holds only a 75% stake in …rm 1. due to their possibly di¤erent ownership stakes in rivals. Lemma 2 shows that whether the fully collusive scheme can be sustained or not depends entirely on the …rm (or …rms) with the minimal ratio between the collusive pro…t, ¼ i (A), and the pro…t from deviation, ¼
We shall refer to this …rm as an industry maverick (there may be more than one industry maverick if several …rms are tied for the minimal ratio between ¼ i (A) and ¼
Since part (i) of Lemma 1 implies that b ij¸0 for all i and all j, it follows immediately from equation (8) 
: in the presence of PCO, …rms either have the same or stronger incentives to collude than they have absent PCO. Moreover, if …rm i does not invest in any rival, then b ij = 0 for all j 6 = i, so …rm i is necessarily an industry maverick and
The question however is whether, starting from a given PCO structure, an increase in one …rm's stake in a rival …rm facilitates or hinders collusion. Addressing this question is a formidable task since in general, even a single change in the PCO matrix, A; will a¤ect all entries in the inverse Leontief matrix, B. From an economic standpoint, that means that an increase in, say, …rm r's stake in rival …rm s, may a¤ect the incentives of all …rms to collude by a¤ecting their pro…ts both under the fully collusive scheme and following a deviation from that scheme. From a purely mathematical standpoint, things are complicated because we are not simply interested in the comparative statics properties of the matrix B. Rather, we wish to know how the lowest ratio between the average value of the entries in row i of B, 1 n P n k=1 b ik , and the diagonal term in that row, b ii ; changes following a change in the PCO matrix A. Nonetheless, in Theorem 1 below, we are able to show that an increase in …rm r's stake in rival …rm s never hinders tacit collusion, and moreover, we establish the precise conditions under which such an increase will surely facilitate tacit collusion. For the purpose of this result, it does not matter whether …rm r increases its stake in …rm s at the expense of outside shareholders or at the expense of …rm s's controller (as long as the controller retains control).
Theorem 1: Starting with a PCO matrix A, suppose that …rm r increases its stake in …rm s by some ! > 0, so that the new PCO matrix A 0 di¤ers from A only with respect to the rs-th entry which is increased by !. Then,
with equality holding if and only if b ir = 0 or i = s.
Theorem 1 may be of independent interest for those interested in the comparative static properties of Leontief systems (these systems play an important role in many areas in economics, e.g., input-output analysis). In our context, Theorem 1 has the following important implication:
Corollary 1: An increase in …rm r's stake in …rm s never hinders tacit collusion.
Corollary 1 follows immediately from the fact that for each …rm i,
Given that PCO never hinders tacit collusion, one may wonder when it will surely facilitate tacit collusion. In the next corollary of Theorem 1, we address this question.
Corollary 2: An increase in …rm r's stake in …rm s surely facilitates tacit collusion if and only if (i) each industry maverick has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm r; and (ii) …rm s is not an industry maverick.
Recalling that a …rm that does not invest in rivals is an industry maverick, an important implication of Corollary 2 is that PCO can facilitate tacit collusion only if every …rm in the industry has a stake in at least one rival. So long as at least one …rm does not invest in rivals, this …rm is an industry maverick, and by part (i) of the corollary, all other PCO in the industry will have no e¤ect on tacit collusion. From a policy perspective, this implies that in industries with similar …rms, antitrust authorities should not be too concerned with unilateral PCO since only multilateral PCO arrangements can facilitate tacit collusion.
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However, in the presence of multilateral PCO arrangements, Corollary 2 implies that in general, an increase in …rm r's stake in a rival …rm s will have anticompetitive coordinated e¤ects and should therefore raise antitrust concerns. The only two exceptions to this conclusion 15 In Gilo and Spiegel (2003) , we showed that when …rms are not similar, even a unilateral investment by the most e¢cient …rm in its rivals can facilitate tacit collusion.
are cases in which an industry maverick has no direct or indirect stake in the investing …rm r; or the rival …rm s is itself an industry maverick.
To illustrate Corollary 2, suppose that there are 10 …rms in the industry and …rms 1 ¡ 4 invest only in each other so that none of them has direct or indirect stakes in …rms 5 ¡ 10.
Then, any increase in the stakes that …rms 5 ¡ 10 hold in rivals, including their stakes in …rms 1 ¡ 4, will surely facilitate tacit collusion unless (i) the industry maverick is either …rm 1, 2, 3, or 4, or (ii) the increased ownership stake is in a maverick …rm. When either (i) or (ii) hold, the increased stake of …rms 5 ¡ 10 in rivals will not a¤ect tacit collusion and will therefore justify a lenient treatment by antitrust authorities.
Condition (ii) in Corollary 2 implies that investment in a maverick …rm has no e¤ect on tacit collusion. This result is striking because the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and FTC state that the "acquisition of a maverick …rm is one way in which a merger may make coordinated interaction more likely." 16 This concern indicates that there may be a fundamental di¤erence between horizontal mergers in which …rms obtain control over their rivals and passive investments in rivals that we study here. In particular, while gaining control over a maverick …rm via a horizontal merger especially raises concerns about coordinated anticompetitive e¤ects, Corollary 2 shows that a mere passive investment in a maverick …rm should not raise any such concerns.
The symmetric PCO case
To obtain further insights about the e¤ect of PCO on tacit collusion, we now consider the symmetric case in which all …rms hold exactly the same ownership stake, ®, in each other.
Since some of the shares of each …rm are held by its controller and potentially other outside shareholders, it must be the case that the aggregate stake of rivals in each …rm i, (n ¡ 1)®, is less than 1:
Proposition 1: Consider the symmetric case in which
for all i and all j 6 = i.
Then, as n increases, tacit collusion is hindered if the aggregate stake of rivals in each …rm is small, i.e., (n ¡ 1) ® < 1 2 , and is facilitated otherwise:
16 See www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html
As equation (1) shows, absent PCO, an increase in the number of …rms hinders collusion.
Proposition 1 shows that in the presence of PCO, this is no longer true: when the aggregate stake of rivals in each …rm exceeds 50%, an increase in the number of …rms facilitates collusion rather than hinders it. 17 The reason for this surprising result is that, holding ® …xed, an increase in n implies that each …rm receives a larger fraction of its pro…ts from rivals. Hence, deviation from the fully collusive scheme which hurts rivals may become unattractive. To illustrate, suppose that each …rms holds a passive stake of 10% in rivals. Then, moving from 6 to 7 …rms will facilitate collusion whereas moving from 4 …rms to 5 will hinder it.
Next, we ask how a deviation from the symmetric stakes case considered in Proposition 1 a¤ects tacit collusion. To this end, suppose that one …rm, say …rm 1, changes its aggregate stake in rivals by ! so that
To ensure that the aggregate stake that rivals hold in each …rm j is less than 1, we will assume that ! < 1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)®. All …rms other than …rm 1 continue to hold an ownership stake ® in each of their rivals. for all i and all j 6 = i, suppose that …rm 1 changes its aggregate stake in rivals by ! < 1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)®.
(i) If ! > 0; then tacit collusion is facilitated, i.e., b ± po < b ±, provided that ! is spread over at least two of …rm 1's rivals, and the incentives to collude are strongest when ! is spread evenly among all of …rm 1's rivals.
(ii) If ! < 0; then tacit collusion is hindered, i.e., b ± po > b ±. Moreover, only the aggregate change in …rm 1's stake in rivals matters and not how it is spread among …rm 1's rivals.
Proposition 2 indicates that if we start from a symmetric PCO con…guration, a unilateral increase in PCO by one …rm raises more antitrust concerns the more evenly it is spread among the rival …rms. Intuitively, the …rm in which …rm 1 has invested the most becomes the industry maverick since its controller gains the most from deviation as a larger fraction of its pro…t from deviation ‡ows back to the …rm via its stake in …rm 1. Obviously, an even spread of ! among all rivals minimizes …rm 1's stake in the industry maverick and therefore minimizes the incentive of the maverick's controller to deviate from the fully collusive scheme.
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Proposition 2 assumes implicitly that when …rm 1 increases its stake in rivals, it buys additional shares from outside investors or from controllers. The next proposition considers a transfer of ownership from one rival …rm to another. A recent example of such a transfer occurred in the steel industry, where Luxembourg based Arcelor, the world's largest steelmaker at the time, increased its stake in Brazilian CST, one of the world's largest steelmakers, from 18:6% to 27:95% by buying shares from Acesita, another Brazilian steelmaker. for all i and all j 6 = i, suppose that …rm 1 buys a stake ! · ® in …rm 3 from …rm 2, so after the transaction, …rm 1's stake in …rm 3 increases to ® + ! while …rm 2's stake in …rm 3 falls to ® ¡ !. This change in the PCO con…guration hinders tacit collusion and more so when ! increases.
Proposition 3 di¤ers from Proposition 2 in that the increase in …rm 1's ownership stake comes at the expense of …rm 2's stake. Hence, the aggregate amount of shares held by rival …rms in each other does not increase as in Proposition 2. While before the transfer of ownership, all …rms were mavericks, following the transfer of ownership, …rm 2 becomes the only industry maverick since it now has the smallest stake in rivals. Consequently, …rm 2 becomes more eager than before to deviate from collusion and this hinders tacit collusion. Together, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that with identical …rms, symmetric PCO con…gurations are the most conducive to tacit collusion and should therefore raise particular anticompetitive concerns.
PCO by controllers
In this section we consider the possibility that controllers will directly acquire (passive) ownership stakes in rival …rms. As mentioned in the Introduction, a case in point is the car rental industry 18 One can show that if we start from an asymmetric PCO con…guration, then it is no longer necessarily true that an even spread of ! leads to a more collusive outcome than an uneven spread of !.
19 Prior to the sale, Acesita held a 18.7% stake in CST but sold its entire stake in CST to Arcelor and to CVRD, which is a large Brazilian miner of iron and ore. In addition to its stake in CST, Arcelor also owns stakes in Acesita and in Belgo-Mineira, which is another Brazilian steelmaker (see "CVRD, Arcelor Team up for CST," The Daily Deal, December 28, 2002, M&A; "Minister: Steel Duties Still Under Study -Brazil," Business News Americas, April 8, 2002.) in the …rst half of the 90's where National Car Rental's controller, GM, passively held a 25% stake in Avis, National's rival, while Hertz's controller, Ford, had acquired 100% of the preferred nonvoting stock of Budget Rent a Car. The question that we address in this section is what e¤ect, if any, such investments have on tacit collusion, above and beyond the e¤ect that we have already identi…ed in the previous section.
To this end, let°i j be the stake that …rm i's controller holds in …rm j 6 = i, in addition to his controlling stake in …rm i,°i i . Of course, if …rm i's controller does not hold a stake in rival …rm j; then°i j = 0. To avoid triviality, we assume that°i j represents a completely passive investment (e.g., non-voting shares) that gives the controller a share°i j of …rm j's pro…t but no control over its actions. Moreover, we assume that°i i is su¢ciently large relative to°i j for all i and all j so that the controller of each …rm i is better o¤ maximizing …rm i's pro…t than sacri…cing …rm i's pro…t in order to boost the pro…ts of rival …rms in which the controller has stakes.
20 Then, the condition that ensures that collusion can be sustained becomes
Condition (9) generalizes condition (6) to the case where controllers hold direct stakes in rival …rms. The left-hand side of (9) is the in…nite discounted payo¤ of …rm i's controller (who may now get a share in the pro…ts of all …rms). The right-hand side of (9) is the controller's one time payo¤ when the …rm he controls, …rm i, deviates from the fully collusive scheme (recall that Lemma 1 implies that ¼ d i j (A) > 0 if and only if …rm j has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm i.)
Using (9) and recalling that
¼ i (A) = ¼ m n P n j=1 b ij and ¼ d i j (A) = b ji ¼ m ,
it follows that with
PCO by controllers, the fully collusive scheme can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium 20 Formally, note that …rm j's pro…t when all n …rms are charging the monopoly price is
If …rm i's controller charges above the monopoly price then …rm i's pro…t is 0, while the pro…t of each …rm j 6 = i is
Hence, …rm i's controller would prefer to set …rm i's price equal to the monopoly price rather than a higher price provided that
This condition is equivalent to°i i¸Pj6 =i ³°i j n¡1 P n k=1 b jk P n k=1 bik´a nd it holds provided that°i i is su¢ciently large relative to°i j for j 6 = i. 
Without PCO by …rms (i.e., when A = 0), B = I so b ii = 1 and b ij = 0 for all i and all j 6 = i. Hence, (11) implies that PCO by controllers facilitates collusion as b ±
The following theorem proves that this continues to be the case even when A 6 = 0. Theorem 2 shows that when …rm i's controller invests in at least one rival …rm, the controller is willing to participate in the fully collusive scheme for a wider set of discount factors.
Moreover, this set becomes even wider as the controller's stake in the …rm he controls, i.e., …rm i, becomes smaller. This implies in turn that …rm i's controller can lower b ± c i (A) either by raising his stake in rival …rms or by diluting his stake in …rm i (subject of course to retaining control over the …rm's actions). Such dilution e¤ectively raises the weight that the controller assigns to rivals' pro…ts and therefore weakens the controller's incentive to deviate from the collusive scheme. This implies in turn that even relatively small direct passive investments by controllers in rival …rms can raise considerable antitrust concern. It should also be noted that b ± c i (A) depends only on the stakes that …rm i's controller has in rival …rms but is completely independent of the stakes that other controllers have in rival …rms.
An important implication of Theorem 2, that to the best of our knowledge has been overlooked in antitrust cases involving PCO by controllers, is that antitrust agencies need to be concerned not only with a controller's stakes in rival …rms, but also with the controller's stake (current or future) in his own …rm. This suggests in turn that consent decrees approving passive investment by controllers should stipulate that the controllers will abstain from further diluting their stakes in their own …rms. 21 For example, shortly after it acquired a passive stake in Budget, Ford diluted its controlling stake in Hertz from 55% to 49% by selling shares to Theorem 2 also has implications for the recent decision of the Brazilian antitrust authorities to allow Telecom Italia (TI) to raise its stake in Telecom Brazil (TB) from 19% to 37:3%
provided that TI would be a passive investor as far as TB's cellular and long distance operations are concerned. TI holds a 56% controlling stake in Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM), Brazil's second largest cellular provider while TB had acquired a cellular license and will be competing with TIM in Brazilian cellular markets. 25 Theorem 2 suggests that stipulating that TI will be a passive investor in TB was not enough to alleviate anticompetitive concerns in the Brazilian cellular market, and moreover, it implies that the fact TI's controlling stake in TIM is merely 56% (rather than 100%) exacerbates these concerns. 21 In …rms that are controlled by managers, compensation that is linked to the pro…ts of rivals may play the same role as investments in rivals. This suggests that executive compensation should receive similar antitrust scrutiny as investments of controllers in rival …rms.
22 See "Chrysler Buying Thrifty Rent-A-Car," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 19, 1989 , Business, 8C. 23 See Proposed Consent Agreement, Time Warner, Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301 (Sept. 25, 1996 for the FTC's decision and Waterman and Weiss (1997) for details about the cable TV industry. 24 See Gilo (2000) for more details on these and similar examples. Interestingly, the ability of …rms to collude is greatly diminished when a …rm's controller internalizes the interests of the minority shareholders and acts to maximize total …rm value rather than only the value of his own stake. This is because such behavior has the exact opposite e¤ect of dilution of the controller's stake: a controller who acts to maximize total …rm value acts as if°i = 1 in which case b ± c i (A) is maximized. In this sense, minority shareholders would prefer the controller to disregard their interests when choosing the …rm's pricing decisions. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom that sees the disregard of minority shareholders as a value decreasing "agency cost," here such disregard is actually bene…cial to all shareholders.
One may wonder if Theorem 1 continues to hold when controllers hold stakes directly in rival …rms. That is, is it still true that any increase in one …rm's stake in a rival …rm will never hinder collusion? The following example shows that the answer is no.
Example (an increase in a …rm's stake in rivals may hinder collusion): Consider an industry with 2 …rms and let ® 12 be …rm 1's stake in …rm 2 and ® 21 be …rm 2's stake in …rm 1.
Moreover, suppose that the controller of …rm i = 1; 2 has a stake of°i 1 in …rm 1 and°i 2 in …rm 2.
It is straightforward to verify that the inverse Leontief matrix is such that
, and
. Using equation (11) we get:
It is easy to see that b ± c 1 (A) decreases with ® 12 : an increase in …rm 1's stake in …rm 2 strengthens the incentive of …rm 1's controller to collude. However, so long as°1 2 > 0; b ± c 1 (A) increases with ® 21 ; implying that an increase in …rm 2's stake in …rm 1 weakens the incentive of …rm 1's controller to collude. Consequently, whenever b ± c 1 (A) > b ± c 2 (A) (…rm 1 is the industry maverick) and°1 2 > 0 (…rm 1's controller holds a stake in …rm 2), an increase in …rm 2's stake in …rm 1 will hinder collusion rather than facilitate it. Moreover, this e¤ect becomes stronger as the stake that …rm 1's controller holds in …rm 2,°1 2 , increases. Hence, Theorem 1 is no longer true in this case. ¥ Finally, Corollary 2 above implies that absent PCO by controllers, an increase in …rm r's stake in …rm s a¤ects neither …rm s's incentive to collude nor the incentive of each …rm i for which b ir = 0, i.e., each …rm i that does not have a direct or an indirect stake in …rm r. The following result shows that this is no longer true in the presence of PCO by controllers.
Proposition 4: Starting with a PCO matrix A, suppose that …rm r increases its stake in …rm s by some ! > 0.
(i) The change weakens …rm s's incentive to collude if …rm s's controller has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm r, i.e., P n k=1°sk b kr > 0, but leaves …rm s's incentives unchanged otherwise.
(ii) The change does not a¤ect …rm i's incentive to collude if …rm i's controller does not have a direct or an indirect stake in …rm r, i.e., b ir = 0 and P k6 =i°ik b kr = 0.
To illustrate Proposition 4, consider an industry with 10 …rms. Firms 1 ¡ 4 invest only in each other (none of them has a stake in …rms 5 ¡ 10), while each of …rms 5 ¡ 10 has either direct or indirect stakes in all rivals. Suppose that …rm 5 increases its stake in …rm 4. Part (i)
of Proposition 4 shows that the incentive of …rm 4's controller to collude will remain unchanged if he has no stake in other …rms or has stakes only in …rms 1 ¡ 4. If …rm 4's controller has a stake in at least one of …rms 5 ¡ 10; then his incentive to collude would be weakened. Part (ii)
of Proposition 4 shows that the increase in …rm 5's stake in …rm 4 will not a¤ect the incentives of …rms 1 ¡ 3 to collude, provided that their controllers do not have stakes in …rms 5 ¡ 10.
In the context of the car rental industry case mentioned above, Proposition 4 implies that had Budget made a passive investment in Hertz, Hertz's incentive to engage in tacit collusion would have become weaker given that Hertz's controller, Ford, already held a passive stake in Budget. Similarly, a passive investment by Avis in National would have weakened National's incentive to engage in tacit collusion given that its controller, GM, also held a passive stake in
Avis. This suggests in turn that …rms have no incentive to acquire stakes in rivals when some of their own shares are held by the controllers of these rivals. Indeed, in the cases involving PCO by controllers discussed here and in Gilo (2000) , PCO by controllers in rivals was never accompanied by PCO by the …rms themselves in rivals.
Conclusion
Acquisitions of one …rm's stock by a rival …rm have been traditionally treated under Section 7 of the Clayton Act which condemns such acquisitions when their e¤ect "may be substantially to lessen competition." However, the third paragraph of this section e¤ectively exempts investments made "solely for investment." As argued in Gilo (2000) , antitrust agencies and courts, when applying this exemption, did not conduct full-blown examinations as to whether such passive investments among rivals may substantially lessen competition.
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In this paper we have shown that an across the board lenient attitude towards passive investments in rivals may be misguided. These investments may facilitate tacit collusion, especially when they are multilateral, are in …rms that are not industry mavericks, and are by …rms in which mavericks hold either direct or indirect stakes. In addition, we showed that direct investments by …rms' controllers in rivals may either substitute investments by the …rms themselves or facilitate collusion further, especially when the controllers have small stakes in their own …rms. On the other hand, if a …rm's controller holds a stake in a rival …rm, passive investment by this rival in the controller's …rm warrants a lenient antitrust approach. We believe that antitrust courts and agencies should take account of these factors when considering cases involving passive investments among rivals.
Throughout the paper we have focused exclusively on the e¤ect of PCO on the ability of …rms to engage in (tacit) price …xing. However, if in addition to price …xing …rms can also divide the market among themselves, then they would clearly be able to sustain collusion for a larger set of discount factors since they would have more instruments (the collusive price and the market shares). In particular, it would be possible to relax the incentive constraints of maverick …rms by increasing their market shares at the expense of …rms with nonbinding incentive constraints. This suggests in turn that in the presence of market sharing schemes, …rms may have an incentive to become industry mavericks in order to receive a larger share of the market. As our analysis shows, one way to become an industry maverick is to avoid investing in rivals. 27 Interestingly, this implies that beside the fact that market sharing schemes are harder to enforce (…rms need to commit to ration their sales) and are more susceptible to antitrust scrutiny, they have another drawback, in that they discourage PCO.
Finally, throughout the paper we made two simplifying assumptions. The …rst assumption is that …rms produce a homogeneous product and have the same cost functions. In Gilo and
Spiegel (2003) we began looking at the case where …rms have asymmetric costs. We showed that even unilateral PCO by the most e¢cient …rm in its rivals may facilitate tacit collusion and the resulting collusive price is higher than it would be absent PCO. Moreover, we showed that the most e¢cient …rm prefers to …rst invest in its most e¢cient rival both because this is the most e¤ective way to promote tacit collusion and because such investment leads to a collusive price that is closer to the most e¢cient …rm's monopoly price. The second simplifying assumption that we made in this paper was that the level of PCO in the industry is exogenously given. In a sense then our analysis is done from the perspective of antitrust authorities: when can you allow a …rm to acquire a passive stake in a rival …rm and when should you disallow such acquisition.
In future research we wish to also look at PCO from the perspective of …rms: that is, we wish to endogenize the con…guration of PCO in the industry and examine when a …rm should try to acquire a passive stake in rivals and when it should not.
Appendix
Following are the proofs of Lemma 1, Theorems 1 and 2, Corollary 2, and Propositions 1-4.
Proof of Lemma 1: Since A is a Leontief matrix, B = (I ¡ A) ¡1 = I + A + A 2 + : : : (see Berck and Sydsaeter, Ch. 21.22, p. 111) . Hence, b ij¸0 for all i and all j and b ii¸1 for all i:
To prove that b ij < b ii , let C k and e k , respectively, be the k-th columns of B and I. Since
, where the matrix A ij is obtained by replacing the i-th column of A by e j . To establish that b ii ¡ b ij > 0, we will next show that
First, since A is a Leontief matrix, so is !A for every ! 2 [0; 1]. Hence, I ¡ !A is invertible, and det(I ¡ !A), which is a continuous function of !, is di¤erent from 0 for all ! 2 [0; 1]. This implies that det(I ¡ !A) never changes sign so det(I ¡ A) and det(I) must have the same sign. Since det(I) > 0, we obtain that det(I ¡ A) > 0.
Next, note that A ij is not a Leontief matrix since, by construction, its i-th column is e j , so the sum of the i-th column is 1 (recall that in a Leontief Matrix the sum of each column must be strictly less than 1). However, for every ! 2 [0; 1), !A ij is a Leontief matrix. Hence, similar arguments as above establish that det(I ¡ !A ij ) > 0 for every ! 2 [0; 1), and det(I ¡ A ij )¸0.
To complete the proof we must show that det(I ¡ A ij ) 6 = 0.
To this end, we begin by showing that (A ij ) 2 is a Leontief matrix. Let v k denote the k-th column in A ij . By the construction of A ij , it follows that for each k 6 = i, v k is the k-th column of A, while v i = e j . Hence, for each k 6 = i, the k-th column of (A ij ) 2 equals P n r=1 ® rk v r . Since P n r=1 ® rk < 1 (the sum of the ownership stakes of rival …rms in each …rm k is less than 1) and since the sum of each v r is less or equal to 1, we conclude that the sum of the k-th column of (A ij ) 2 is strictly less than 1. Moreover, the i-th column of (A ij ) 2 equals v j , so its sum is also strictly less than 1. Consequently, (A ij ) 2 is a Leontief matrix.
However,
as required.
(ii) To prove the result, note that …rm i does not have a direct or an indirect stake in …rm j if and only if there is a partition (X; Y ) of the set of …rms f1; 2; : : : ; ng (i.e., X \ Y = ?, X [ Y = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, X; Y 6 = ?) such that i 2 X, j 2 Y and ® rk = 0 for each r 2 X, k 2 Y .
That is, no …rm in the subset X has a stake in a …rm that belongs to Y . However, the existence of such partition is equivalent to the property that the ij ¡ th entry in A`is 0 for each`(see Frobenius (1912) and Jones, Klin, and Moshe (2002) ). The proof is completed by noting that b ij = 0 if and only if the ij ¡ th entry of A`is 0 for each`.
(iii) Let ®`i j denote the ij ¡ th entry of A`.
("If" part) Suppose that there exists a …rm j 6 = i such that …rm j has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm i and …rm i has a direct or an indirect stake in …rm j: By part (ii) of the lemma, b ji > 0 and b ij > 0. Since B = I + A + A 2 : : : ; then ®`1 ij > 0, ®`2 ji > 0 for somè 1 ;`2¸1. Given that A`1 +`2 = A`1A`2, it follows that ®`1
Since B = I + A + A 2 : : : , we conclude that b ii > 1.
("Only if" part) Suppose that b ii > 1. Since B = I + A + A 2 : : : , then ®`i i > 0 for somè¸1 (iv) Recalling that ® kj is …rm k's stake in …rm j, the aggregate stake of "real equityholders" (i.e., controllers and outside equityholders) in each …rm j is 1 ¡ P k6 =j ® kj . Since …rm j's direct and indirect stake in each …rm i is b ji , the aggregate stake that "real" equityholders of …rm j have in …rm i is
Summing over all j, the aggregate share of "real" equityholders (of all …rms) have in each …rm i is b b i´P n j=1
To prove the result, we need to show that b b i = 1 for all i. 
Since I 1 ; : : : ; I n are independent, we get ½ k = 0 for each k 6 = i; s. If i 6 = s then ½ i = 1 and 
Proof: By Lemma A1, the i-th row of B 0 is B i + " i B s . Thus,
For every distinct pair of …rms, i and s, we have
Proof: Let M´BE, where E is a diagonal n £ n matrix with 1 ¡ 
is the i-th entry of u (and each other entry of u equals 1). Next, assume that i 6 = s and b ir 6 = 0. In Lemma A1 we show that !b sr < 1 and hence
Proof of Corollary 2: By Theorem 1, we can prove the corollary by proving that an increase in …rm r's stake in …rm s has no e¤ect on tacit collusion if and only if (i) there exist an industry maverick, m; without a direct or an indirect stake in …rm r; or (ii) …rm s is an industry maverick. 
If …rm i's controller deviates from the fully collusive scheme, then system (3) can be written as
j ; j = 1; :::; n; j 6 = i:
Solving this system for ¼
Substituting from (A-3) and (A-4) into equation (8) reveals that
; i = 1; :::; n:
It is straightforward to verify that this expression increases with n if (n ¡ 1) ® < 1 2 ¼ 2 = ::: = ¼ n , system (2) can be written as
Solving this system yields
H ¡ ®! ; j = 2; :::; n;
where H´(1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)®) (1 + ®).
We now need to compute the pro…t that each …rm obtains when its controller deviates from the fully collusive scheme. If …rm 1's controller deviates, then system (3) becomes
j ; j = 2; :::; n:
From (A-6) and (A-7) it follows that
If the controller of some …rm i 6 = 1 deviates from the fully collusive scheme, then system (3) can be written as
j ; j = 2; :::; n; j 6 = i:
Solving this system for ¼ From (A-6) and (A-9) it follows that
To compare b ± 1 and b ± i , note that holding ! constant, b ± i increases with ® 1i and hence is minimized at ® 1i = ®, i.e., when the increase in …rm 1's PCOs is in …rms other than i. Now, for all i 6 = 1,
If !¸0, then b ± i > b ± 1 for all values of ® 1i and all i 6 = 1. Now suppose that …rm 1's largest PCO is in …rm i so that ® 1i¸®1j for all j 6 = 1: Since b ± i increases with ® 1i , max n b ± 2 ; b ± 3 ; :::; b ± n o = b ± i . That is, …rm i is the industry maverick and b ± po = b ± i . When either ! = 0 (…rm 1 does not increase its stake in rivals so that ® 1i = ®) or ® 1i = ® + ! (…rm 1 increases its ownership stake only in …rm j), b ± i coincides with the expression in equation (A-5). Otherwise, since b ± i decreases with !, tacit collusion is facilitated when …rm 1 increases its aggregate stake in rivals. Since b ± i increases with ® 1i , tacit collusion is particularly facilitated when ! is spread evenly among all of its rivals in which case, for every !, ® 1i is minimal and equal to ® + ! n¡1
. By contrast, if ! < 0, then b ± i is maximized at ® 1i = ®, i.e., whenever …rm 1 lowers its ownership stake in …rms other than …rm i. Moreover, (A-11) shows that b ± i < b ± 1 for all i 6 = 1.
Consequently, b ±
Using (A-13) and (A-15) yields
And, if the controller of some …rm i = 3; :::; n deviates, the solution to the modi…ed system (2) shows that its pro…t, ¼ d i i , is equal to the right-hand side of (A-4). Since the collusive pro…t of …rm i = 3; :::; n in (A-13) is equal to the right-hand side of (A-3), it follows that b ± i (!) = b ± po for all i = 3; :::; n, where b ± po is given by the right-hand side of (A-5). Now note that (i) b ± 1 (!) = b ± 2 (¡!) ; (ii) b ± 1 (0) = b ± i (!), and (iii) b ± 0 1 (!) < 0. Since ! > 0, it follows that b ± 2 (!) > b ± i (!) > b ± 1 (!) : Hence, the critical discount factor above which the fully collusive outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated game is b ± 2 (!). Since b ± 2 (!) > b ± i (!) = b ± po , it follows that tacit collusion is hindered. ¥ Proof of Theorem 2: Using equations (11) and (8) 
